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The notion of ‘core’ for a game was defined as an independent solution concept by Gillies
and Shapley[l] [2]. The most basic issue is the core to be non-empty. The work of Bondereve[3]
and Shapley[4] were on the balancedness condition for the non-emptiness of the core of a TU
game and Scarf’s[5] work was on balancedness in NTU games. In this report, we will study
a general problem: Given $nNTU$ games, is there a tight coupling between $nNTU$ games so
that the common core has non-empty?
Let $N=\{1,2, \ldots, n\},$ $\eta$ the collection of all non-empty subsets of $N$ , and for $S\in\eta$ ,
$E^{S}=$ { $(x_{1},$ $\ldots,x_{n})\in \mathrm{R}^{n};x:=0$ if $i\not\in S$}.
Let $X\subset E^{N},$ $S\in\eta,$ $\alpha=(\alpha_{1}, \ldots, \alpha_{n}),$ $\beta=(\beta_{1}, \ldots, \beta_{n})$ . Denote by $\alpha^{S}$ the projection of $\alpha$ to
$E^{S}$ . Denote by” $\leq$” the natural order on $E^{N}$ . $X$ is comprehensive if $\alpha\in X,$ $\beta\leq\alpha$ then $\beta\in X$ .
Denote by $\hat{X}$ the comprehensive $h\tau dl$ of $X$ , that is, the smallest comprehensive set containing
X. An NTU game (game without side payments) is an ordered triple $(N, F, D)$ . Here $F$ is a
closed subset of $E^{N}$ , and $D$ is a function from $\eta$ to open, comprehensive non-empty, proper
subsets of $E^{N}$ that satisfies
(i) $D(N)\subset\hat{F}$ ,
(ii) if $\alpha\in D(S)$ and $\alpha^{S}=\beta^{S}$ then $\beta\in D(S)$ ,
(iii) for each $S\in\eta$ ,
{ $\alpha^{S}$ ; a $\in\overline{D(S)}\backslash \bigcup_{i\in S}D(\{i\})$}
is non-empty and bounded. Here $\overline{D(S)}$ denotes the closure of $D(S)$ .
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The core of the game $(N, F, D)$ is defined to be the set
$F \backslash \bigcup_{S\in\eta}D(S)$
.
The core represents the set of feasible outcomes that cannot be improved upon by any condi-
tion. A game $(N, F, D)$ is said to be balanced if
$\bigcap_{S\in\beta}D(S)\subset\hat{F}$
.
Theorem 1. (Scarf) Every balanced game has a nonempty core.
Shapley[6] proved a balanced KKM theorem rooted in balanced Sperner’s lemma.
To state multiple balanced $KKM$ theorem proved by Shih and Lee[7], let us recall some
notations. Let $\{r_{1}, \ldots, r_{n}\}$ be affinely independent in $E^{N}$ . For $X\subset E^{N},$ convX denotes the
convex hull of $X$ . Let
$A^{S}=\omega nv\{r:;i\in S\}$ ,
$m_{S}= \frac{1}{\# S}\sum_{:\in s}r_{1}$ .
We say that $\{F_{1};i\in N\}$ is a $KKM$ covering of $A^{N}$ if for each $i\in N,$ $F_{1}$ is closed in $A^{N}$ , and
$A^{S} \subset.\bigcup_{1\epsilon s}F_{1}$
for all $S\in\eta$ .
We say that $\{C_{S)}S\in\eta\}$ is a Shaply covering of $A^{N}$ if for each $S\in\eta,$ $C_{S}$ is closed in $A^{N}$ , and
$A^{S} \subset\bigcup_{T\subset s,\tau\neq\emptyset}C_{T}$
.
Let $\pi$ : $\etaarrow A^{N}$ and $\pi(S)\in A^{S}$ for all $S\in\eta$ . We say that $\beta\subset\eta$ is balanced if
$m_{N}\in conv\{m_{s;}S\in\beta\}$ ;
$\beta$ is $\pi$-balanced if
$m_{N}\in\omega nv\{\pi(S);S\in\beta\}$ .
Theorem 2. (Shih and Lee) Let $\{C_{S}^{1};S\in\eta\},$ $i=1,2,$ $\ldots,n$, be $n$ Shapley coverings of
$A^{N}$ , and $\pi(S)\in A^{N}$ for all $S\in\eta$ . Then there exists a $\pi$ -balanced family $\{S_{1}, \ldots, S_{n}\}$ such
that
$C_{S_{1}}^{1}\cap\ldots\cap C_{S_{\hslash}}^{n}\neq\emptyset$ .
Theorem 2 was built upon the following multiple balanced Sperner’s lemma.
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Theorem 3. (Shih and Lee) Let $T$ be a simplicial subdivision of $A^{N},$ $T^{0}$ the vertex set of
T. Let
$\Phi=(\varphi^{1}, \ldots, \varphi^{n})$ : $T^{0}$ $-$ , $2^{N}\cross\cdots\cross 2^{N}$
be such that
$\Phi(T^{0}\cap A^{S})\subset 2^{S}\cross\cdots\cross 2^{S}$ for all $S\in\eta$ ,
and $\pi(S)\in A^{S}$ for all $S\in\eta$ . Then there exist an $(n-1)$ -simplex $cmv\{v_{1}, \ldots, v_{n}\}\in T$ and a




There is a tight coupling between NTU games and Shapley coverings. Indeed, we have
Theorem 4. Let $\pi(S)\in A^{S}$ for all $S\in\eta$ , and $V_{8}=(N, F, D:)nNTU$ games, $i=1,$ $\ldots,$ $n$ .
Then there exist $n$ Shapley coverings $\{C_{S}^{1};S\in\eta\}ofA^{N},$ $i=1,$ $\ldots,n$ , induced by $n$ games
$V_{1},$
$\ldots,$
$V_{n}$ , and there $e$ tists $\pi$ -balanced family $\{S_{1}, \ldots, S_{n}\}$ such that
$C_{S_{1}}^{1}\cap C_{S_{2}}^{2}\cap\ldots\cap C_{S_{\hslash}}^{n}\neq\emptyset$.
$\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\hslash hermore$, if for all $i=1,2,$ $\ldots,$ $n_{f}V_{i}$ is $\pi$ -balanced and there enists
$\alpha\in C_{S_{1}}^{1}\cap C_{S_{2}}^{2}\cap\ldots C_{S_{n}}^{n}$
such that $\alpha\in C_{S_{1}}^{1}\cap C_{S_{2}}^{1}\cap\ldots\cap C_{S_{\hslash}}^{i}$ for $dli=1,2,$ $\ldots,$ $n$ , then
Core$(V_{1})\cap Core(V_{2})\cap\ldots\cap Core(V_{n})\neq\emptyset$ .
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